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I. INTRODUCTION	
Federal discovery reform is yet again at the forefront  
of procedural debate.  As has been said about personal jurisdiction, 
discovery “used to seem so easy.”1  The original Federal Rules of  
																																								 																				
*  Associate Professor, The University of Akron School of Law.  This article 
benefitted greatly from the comments of Elizabeth A. Reilly.  I also thank Marian J. 
Kousaie for research support. 
1. Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1444, 1444 (1988); see also Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in 
Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. 
L. REV. 27, 30 (1994) (concluding that “[t]he idea behind discovery seemed simple” 
to Professor Sutherland, who wrote the first draft of the discovery provisions, and 
George Ragland, whose work on discovery was important to Sutherland; “[l]awyers 
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Civil Procedure, as adopted in 1938, were intended to minimize 
procedural default and promote resolution of cases on the merits.2   
The discovery rules had two oft-articulated goals—to assist in 
ascertaining the truth and to permit courts to do justice.3  Pleading  
was deemphasized, requiring only notice to the opposing party of  
the conduct giving rise to the claim, with the majority of the sorting 
of strong and weak claims to occur in discovery.4  The original 
discovery rules enabled these goals by allowing parties to obtain  
all relevant, non-privileged information before trial,5 but little  
heed was paid to the costs that broad discovery might create. 
The discovery provisions of the original Federal Rules played 
an important role in the federal courts’ transition from trial  
by surprise—the so-called “sporting theory of justice”—to trial on  
the merits.6  As some concluded, the advent of discovery allowed 
litigants in the federal courts to play their hands “with all the cards  
on the table.”7 
Those that sought to limit discovery under the nascent Federal 
Rules claimed the Rules allowed fishing expeditions; however,  
																																								 																				
wanted to ‘hide the ball,’” but effective litigation and resolution of cases required 
that parties share information). 
2. See, e.g., Abraham E. Freedman, Discovery as an Instrument of Justice, 22 
TEMP. L.Q. 174, 175 (1948); see also Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural 
Rules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive 
Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 88 (1997)	 (“The Federal Rule reformers wanted the 
complete story to come out in litigation.”). 
3. Alexander Holtzoff, The Elimination of Surprise in Federal Practice, 7 
VAND. L. REV. 576, 577–78 (1954). 
4. Id. 
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (1970) (amended 1970) (deponents may be examined 
“regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action”).  In 1970, Rule 26(b)(1) was amended to provide 
explicitly that this broad scope of discovery applied to all discovery devices.  FED. 
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2010). 
6. Irving Kaufman, Judicial Control Over Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 111, 115, 125 
(1961); Holtzoff, supra note 3, at 576–79; Alexander Holtzoff, Origin and Sources 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1057, 1059–60 (1955); 
Subrin, supra note 1, at 30. 
7. Freedman, supra note 2, at 175; see also Edson R. Sunderland, Discovery 
Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L. REV. 737, 739 (1939) 
(noting that discovery would result in each party’s “lay[ing] all his cards upon the 
table, the important consideration [then] being who has the stronger hand, not who 
can play the cleverer game”). 
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courts and commentators alike concluded that discovery requests  
were not  “‘fishing expedition[s],’ if there appear[ed] any reasonable 
possibility that there [might] be a fish in the pond.”8  Broad discovery 
had become an essential element in the federal courts’ commitment  
to doing justice. 
The civil litigation landscape has changed dramatically since 
the original Federal Rules were promulgated.  Cases now vary  
widely in size and in kind.9  Litigation and discovery strategies have 
changed, trials are rare,10 and attorneys sometimes wonder if truth  
can be defined in the litigation context.11  Even methods of creating, 
saving, and using information have changed, resulting in an avalanche 
of information that is available—in varying formats—for discovery.  
Moreover, there is disagreement about the extent of discovery  
costs:  indeed, although it has been contended for decades that 
discovery costs have soared, empirical research has established  
that discovery costs are not “significant or disproportionate,” except 
																																								 																				
8. Freedman, supra note 2, at 175; accord Holtzoff, supra note 3, at 577–78 
(“fishing is permitted if there is a reasonable prospect of fish being caught”); 
Kaufman, supra note 6, at 115 (“[T]he federal rules authorize ‘fishing expeditions,’ 
so long as the fish may become bait with which to catch admissible evidence, and 
so long as certain rules to prevent outrageously unsportsmanlike conduct are not 
overstepped.”); see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (discussing 
the historical development of discovery, particularly how facts uncovered by one 
party are subject to discovery from the opposing party). 
9. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: 
Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 601–02, 605–06 (2010) (offering a 
number of explanations for the increased amount and variety of cases on the federal 
docket); Richard Marcus, “Looking Backward” to 1938, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 
1695–1707 (2014). 
10. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and 
Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 
399, 399–401 (2011) (narrating law firm’s shift from away from trial based 
advocacy). 
11. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical 
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 744 (1998) 
(identifying, as a “conceptual flaw” in the outlook of the drafters of the original 
discovery rules, that they “treated facts as if they were a static, knowable item to be 
found[,] [with] discovery . . . compared to an x–ray that reveals the inner nature of 
the body,” while “contemporary scientific and literary notions invite one even to be 
suspicious that there are objective ‘facts’”). 
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in a small number of complex, high-stakes cases.12  As it has  
become apparent, however, that federal discovery will not and  
perhaps should not provide for obtaining all relevant discovery in all 
cases, the debate focuses on appropriate methods for calibrating 
discovery. 
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of  
Civil Procedure (Advisory Committee) recently responded to  
renewed contentions that discovery is often disproportionate to the 
needs of cases filed in federal court in a manner consistent with 
rulemakers’ responses since the early 1980s:  by proposing 
amendments to the discovery rules13 and judicial-case-management 
																																								 																				
12. Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice 
Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1088–89 (2012); see also 
Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang, & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 658 (2013) (discussing how empirical research over 
the last 40 years has indicated that disproportionately expensive discovery is only a 
problem in a small slice of litigation—high stakes, complex cases) (citing Robert 
W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer – A Brief Informal History of a Myth with Some 
Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1169, 1199 (2009); Linda S. Mullenix, 
Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the 
Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1440–42 (1994); 
Jordan M. Singer, Proportionality’s Cultural Foundation, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
145, 151 (2012) (discussing how empirical studies since the 1960s have found that 
discovery is extensive and burdensome only in a small percentage of civil cases, and 
the possibility that in a majority of civil cases, no discovery takes place at all); 
Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Trans-substantive Procedure: An Essay on 
Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 392 (2010) 
(indicating that “[a]bout a half or a third of civil lawsuits (depending on the study) 
have no discovery, and the cases that utilize discovery frequently do not have more 
than two or three discovery incidents, perhaps a deposition or two and a set of 
interrogatories.”). 
13. The revisions include amendments to the following discovery provisions 
of the Federal Rules:  (1) Rule 26(b)(1) (amending, inter alia, the “scope” of 
discovery to revise and relocate the so-called “proportionality” factors from Rule 
26(b)(2)(C) to Rule 26(b)(1)); (2) Rule 26(c)(1)(B) (enlarging items that may be 
included in a protective order to include “allocation of expenses” or cost–shifting); 
(3) Rule 34 (specifying various changes when responding to discovery requests); (4) 
Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(iv) (providing rule–based authority for an order to compel 
production if “a party fails to produce documents” as requested); and (5)  Rule 
26(d)(2) (providing that parties may serve Rule 34 production requests before the 
Rule 26(f) meeting between the parties). See Memorandum from Judge David G. 
Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Judge 
Jeffrey Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure on the 
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, B-4 to B-11, B-30 
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provisions14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The 2015 
Federal Rule amendments (2015 Rule Amendments) became law  
on December 1, 2015.15  The 2015 Rule Amendments include multiple 
changes to the discovery and case management features of the Federal 
Rules: (1) promotion of earlier discovery, which is intended to  
permit more informed discussions between the parties at the Rule 
26(f) conference and with the judge at the initial case management 
conference, and to facilitate earlier judicial case management;16  
(2) encouragement of direct communication between judges  
and attorneys;17 (3) encouragement of greater cooperation by  
parties in achieving Rule 1’s goals of “just, speedy, and inexpensive 
																																								 																				
to B-36 (June 14, 2014) (available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd 
Policies/rules/Reports/ST09–2014–add.pdf) [hereinafter Judge Campbell 
Memorandum].   
14. Rule 16 was amended to: (1) to encourage case management conferences 
with direct exchanges between the parties and the judge; (2) to move forward the 
time for the initial case management conference to 90 days after any defendant has 
been served or 60 days after any defendant has appeared, absent good cause for a 
later case management conference; (3) to add preservation of electronically stored 
information and discussion of potential agreements under Fed. R. Evid. 502 to the 
list of items that may be included in a case management order; and (4) to include in 
the list of items for discussion at an initial case management conference the issue of 
whether parties should be required to confer with the court before filing discovery 
motions.  FED. R. CIV. P. 16.  Amendments to Rule 4(m) reduce the time for serving 
the summons and complaint and to Rule 1 encourage cooperation among parties 
during litigation. FED. R. CIV. P. 4; see Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 
13, at B-11 to B-13, B-21 to B-29 (discussing proposed changes to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure that emphasize that the initial case management meeting may be 
conducted by any means of direct simultaneous communication; change the time for 
holding scheduling conferences from 120 days to 90 days or 60 days after the 
defendant has appeared; and change the time limit for serving the summons and 
complaints from 120 days to 90 days). 
15. The Supreme Court sent notices of its adoption of the amendments to 
Congress on April 29, 2015. Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 575 U.S. __ (2015). See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1988). 
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f); see Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, 
at B-11 to B-13. 
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 16; see Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13,  
at B-12. 
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resolution of every action”;18 and (4) facilitation of greater 
proportionality between the needs of a case and the permissible extent 
of discovery through amendments to the scope-of-discovery provision 
in Rule 26(b)(1).19  
This Article focuses primarily on the fourth aspect of the 2015 
Rule Amendments—the requirement that the parties or judges make a 
“proportionality” analysis in each case to determine the scope of 
permissible discovery.  Amended Rule 26(b)(1) authorizes parties to 
obtain discovery regarding “any non-privileged matter that is relevant 
to any party’s claim or defense,” if that matter is also “proportional to 
the needs of the case,” based on the following factors:  “the importance 
of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the 
parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, 
the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether 
the burden or expense of the  discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”20  
This amendment, combined with other amendments to Rule 26(b)(1), 
completes the move in the federal courts from a default philosophy of 
broad and liberal discovery to a landscape in which there is no default 
or guiding principle, other than an open-ended appeal to 
proportionality.21  The 2015 version of Rule 26(b)(1) requires 
																																								 																				
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. Rule 1 previously provided that the rules should “be 
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (2014). Rule 1 now 
provides that “[the rules should] be construed, administered, and employed by the 
court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action and proceeding.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  The Committee Note regarding 
Rule 1 indicates that the changes are intended to encourage lawyers and parties to 
cooperate to achieve the goals of a “just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution of 
actions.  Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-13.  See generally 
Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 287, 297 (2010) (concluding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 1’s principle of 
achieving the “just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution of cases provided 
meaningful guidance when considered in the context of the goals and beliefs of the 
original federal rulemakers, but that, in the modern litigation landscape, the 
potentially conflicting goals of “just,” “speedy,” and “inexpensive” litigation require 
trade-offs that the rule makers should address directly).  
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, 
at B-4 to B-5. 
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, 
at B-30.  
21. See generally Philip J. Favro & Derek P. Pullan, New Utah Rule 26: A 
Blueprint for Proportionality Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2012 
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unelected federal court judges to make unguided policy decisions that 
directly impact the winners and losers of the substantive claims before 
them. Rule 26(b)(1) promotes proportionality but lacks the normative 
guideposts that could instruct a judge’s proportionality decisions, 
defaulting instead to a balancing-of-factors process that requires 
parties or judges to balance various relevant factors but that provides 
minimal guidance on the priority among factors or the weight to be 
accorded to the factors. 
I conclude that the policymaking required of judges to 
determine the permissible scope of discovery under the 
proportionality standard is at the boundaries of the institutional 
competence of the federal courts, at variance with the separation-of-
powers instinct and requirement of the Rules Enabling Act,22 and may 
decrease the deference due to substantive state law under the Erie 
doctrine.23  The new proportionality standard24 permits and requires 
																																								 																				
MICH. ST. L. REV. 933, 975 (2012) (suggesting that federal rulemakers adopt 
proportionality limits on the scope of discovery and that the proportionality 
provision adopted in the Utah Civil Procedure Rules would provide a useful pattern); 
Gordon W. Netzorg & Tobin D. Kern, Proportional Discovery: Making It the Norm, 
Rather Than the Exception, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 513, 513, 528–32 (2010) 
(advocating the elimination of the default of “broad and liberal” discovery and 
replacing it with a “principle” of “proportionality”). But see Robert G. Bone, Who 
Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 
1990–96, 2016 (2007) (concluding that, when rulemakers delegate discretion to 
judges to make procedural choices by balancing listed factors, the result may be an 
“ad hoc weighing that lacks meaningful constraint and jeopardizes principled 
consistency over the system as a whole,” unless the rulemakers also provide clear 
guiding principles); David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of 
American Law, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1191, 1222, 1228 (2013) (acknowledging that 
federal courts have institutional limitations that prevent them from being able to, in 
particular cases, make a contextualized cost-benefit analysis, measure results of 
applying a substance-specific rule, evaluate normatively resulting data, or estimate 
the probable results of applying substance-specific rules). 
22. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074 (2014); see Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and 
Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 693, 700–01 (1988). 
23. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
24. Recognizing that “proportionality” factors have been included in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since 1983, I, nevertheless, occasionally refer to 
the proportionality balance required of parties and judges under Rule 26(b)(1) as 
“new”.  This is because the new positioning of the proportionality balancing factors 
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judges to set different boundaries for different types of substantive 
claims in individual cases.  It thus requires judges to make normative 
choices about the scope of discovery, based on the necessarily 
incomplete information that will be available in the confines of federal 
court litigation.  Moving far from the neutral umpire analogy in which 
a judge calls balls and strikes based on a standard strike zone,25 the 
proportionality amendment to Rule 26(b)(1) essentially permits and 
requires judges to create different discovery strike zones for each 
batter—sometimes making the strike zone narrower than home plate 
and sometimes constricting the height of the standard strike zone—
before ruling on balls and strikes. It, moreover, requires judges to 
narrow the permissible discovery zone based on relative concepts of 
“proportionality” that provide minimal normative guidance and based 
on insufficient information.26  My call?  “Just a bit outside”27 the 
institutional capacity and role of federal judges—even for judges who 
																																								 																				
as part of the definition of discoverable matter, rather than as a limitation on 
otherwise discoverable information, will in all likelihood result in that balance 
playing a new and critical role in determining the extent of discovery. See Marcus, 
supra note 9, at 1717 (discussing the increase in attention paid to proportionality, 
and tracing it to rule changes and the difficulty of application); see also Bernadette 
Bollas Genetin, Summary Judgment and the Influence of Federal Rulemaking, 43 
AKRON L. REV. 1107, 1120 (2010) (observing, with respect to Rule 56 regarding 
summary judgment, that when the text of the Rule provides a limitation, judges take 
heed). 
25. Major League Baseball defines its standard strike zone as “that area over 
home plate the upper limit of which is a horizontal line at the midpoint between the 
top of the shoulders and the top of the uniform pants, and the lower level is a line at 
the hollow beneath the kneecap.” http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official_info/umpires/ 
rules_interest.jsp. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 21, at 1972–73 (noting that the 
“dominant paradigm of party-controlled litigation . . . envisioned a fairly limited role 
for the trial judge as detached and neutral umpire and thus a limited domain over 
which judicial discretion would operate”). But see Freedman, supra note 2, at 181 
(federal trial judge was not to play the role of the neutral umpire, but was given 
latitude to do justice in individual cases). 
26. Bone, supra note 21, at 1990–96 (describing problems of information 
access that hamper federal judges in attempts to create case–specific procedure); 
Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic 
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 917–18, 926–30 (1999); 
Marcus, supra note 21, at 1230–31; Singer, supra note 12, at 183.  See also Bryan 
L. Adamson, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) as an Ideological Weapon, 34 
FLA. ST. L. REV. 1025, 1045 (2007) (noting that the appellate courts, rather than 
district courts, are charged with norm declaration or norm elaboration).  
27. MAJOR LEAGUE (Paramount Pictures 1989). 
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have been granted a wide measure of discretion under the Federal 
Rules.28 
In Section II, this Article briefly examines the evolution of the 
discovery rules since their adoption in 1938.  In Section III, the Article 
discusses the 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) and, in particular, the 
relocation of the proportionality balancing factors to operate as part of 
the definition of discoverable information under Rule 26(b)(1).  It also 
reviews other discovery-limiting amendments to Rule 26(b)(1).  
Section IV then explores the institutional limitations of the federal 
courts, concluding that the proportionality amendment to Rule 
26(b)(1) asks judges to assume a role that is at odds with the federal 
courts’ institutional competence and requires decision making that 
may often exceed the federal judges’ normative lawmaking authority.  
In Section IV, the Article also considers that the way forward may be 
along a path that requires both (1) judicial decision making that 
acknowledges the values embedded in existing law; and (2) additional 
rulemaking that provides greater guidance regarding proportionality.  
First, in making decisions regarding proportionate discovery, judges 
should further the normative preferences of Congress and other 
lawmakers in cases involving favored statutory claims29 and should 
also promote rights otherwise recognized in the substantive law.30 
																																								 																				
28. E.g., Bone, supra note 21, at 1962, 1967 (concluding that “[c]ase-specific 
discretion has been at the heart of the Federal Rules ever since they were first 
adopted in 1938”); see also id. at 1968–70 (observing that the Federal Rules include 
both explicit delegations of “broad discretion” and “vague language inviting case–
specific interpretation”); Subrin, supra note 1, at 35–36; Subrin, supra note 12, at 
377, 382, 391. 
29. See Subrin, supra note 12, at 400 (discussing Congress’s preference for 
energetic enforcement of some statutes “by providing for multiple damages or fee 
shifting for successful plaintiffs”); see also Burbank & Subrin, supra note 10, at 
405–06, 411 (discussing Congress’s use of private enforcement actions to aid in 
enforcement of important social goals and recommending that such actions be 
exempted from any “simple track” procedural options which provide for lesser 
discovery). 
30. See Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 12, at 644, 646–48 (discussing 
the federal government’s increasing reliance on private enforcement in both 
statutory and administrative law in four different periods—during and after the Civil 
War; “during the Progressive Era, [bridging] the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries;” “during the Great Depression in the 1930s;” and “following the Civil 
Rights and ‘Great Society’ period in the 1960s”—and suggesting that judicial action, 
664 THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION [Vol. 34:4 
 
 
	
Second, judges should articulate the rationale underlying their 
proportionality decisions to, among other things, promote 
development of the law regarding proportionality in discovery; 
enhance appellate review of proportionality decisions; and provide the 
necessary flexibility in proportionality decisions, while revealing the 
extent of court adherence to normative preferences of Congress and 
other lawmakers.  Finally, the rulemakers should achieve the goal of 
proportionality by providing greater instruction regarding application 
of the proportionality factors or by creating a general set of discovery 
procedures for most cases and supplementing the general procedure 
with substance-specific protocols for selected substantive claims that 
exhibit recurring discovery problems.31    
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL DISCOVERY RULES 
The original discovery rules were promulgated as part of a 
procedural system whose drafters wanted the complete story of the 
litigation to be told.  The optimal procedural system, they believed, 
should ensure that the party deserving to prevail on the merits would 
prevail, whether the dispute was resolved through trial, settlement, or 
																																								 																				
including some case management tools, could “subvert the policy preferences of the 
enacting Congress”); see also Marcus, supra note 21, at 1228–30 (noting that courts, 
when creating substance–specific process law rather than following a general, trans-
substantive rule of procedure, tend to resort to their own normative policy 
preferences that may clash with existing preferences of Congress or that are, in any 
event, “better left to coordinate branches”); Subrin, supra note 12, at 400.  
31. E.g., Burbank, supra note 22, at 716–18;	Burbank & Subrin, supra note 10, 
at 409–10, 412; Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 547–48 (1986); Subrin, supra note 1, at 28–29, 45–56; 
Subrin, supra note 12, at 399–405; see also Stephen S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, 
Four Years After Duke: Where Do We Stand on Calibrating the Pretrial Process?, 
18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 643, 650–51, 654–57  (2014) (supporting the  
proportionality balancing, but suggesting that it should be complimented by 
“scheme–based reform efforts”); Singer, supra note 12, at 200–02. In fact, while 
working on the 2015 Rule Amendments, the Advisory Committee worked with the 
National Employment Lawyers Association and the Institute for Advancement of 
the American Legal System to create discovery protocols for use in employment 
cases alleging adverse action. Gensler & Rosenthal, supra, at 654–55; see also 
Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-3 (discussing that these 
protocols “include substantial mandatory disclosures required of both sides at the 
beginning of employment cases”). 
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otherwise.32  The original federal rulemakers, however, also aspired 
to create a procedural system that was simple, uniform, and flexible 
enough to apply to all cases, both legal and equitable.33  A byproduct 
of these goals was the generality and trans-substantivity of the 
resulting Federal Rules.34  
To minimize technical default and, at the same time, facilitate 
the resolution of cases on the merits, the original federal rulemakers 
drafted rules that simplified pleading; established broad, party-
managed discovery; promoted liberal joinder of claims and parties; 
and encouraged trial on the merits with the full facts.35  Indeed, the 
watchwords of the original federal rulemakers were “generosity” and 
“liberality,”36 which they achieved (in large measure) by giving 
discretion to judges.37 
The discovery rules, acknowledged by the rulemakers as 
“revolutionary,” were an important element of the bold new 
procedural system.38  Discovery would provide justice to those who 
lacked evidence, permit parties to uncover the truth, and provide for 
																																								 																				
32. Subrin, supra note 2, at 88; Subrin, supra note 1, at 35. 
33. Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1015, 1019, 1025–26 (1982); Bone, supra note 21, at 1971–72; Bernadette Bollas 
Genetin, Expressly Repudiating Implied Repeals Analysis: A New Framework for 
Resolving Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, 51 EMORY 
L.J.  677, 690 (2002); Subrin, supra note 12, at 382. 
34.  Subrin, supra note 12, at 383, 385. 
35. Subrin, supra note 1, at 30-32. 
36. The rules made “generous and liberal provisions” for counterclaims and 
cross claims; included a “liberal provision” regarding third–party practice; 
contained, in Rule 16, “a device with magnificent potentialities” that would permit 
the judge to “control[] the subsequent course of the action;” included, in Rule 18, a 
joinder of claims provision that was “especially liberal;” and established ”generous” 
rules relating to depositions and discovery that could be termed “revolutionary.” 
Armistead M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261, 
267–71, 275, 279 (1939).  
37. Bone, supra note 21, at 1967–70. 
38. Dobie, supra note 38, at 275; see also Sunderland, supra note 7, at 738–39 
(noting that the original discovery rules permitted parties to seek “almost unlimited 
discovery” and that, combined with pretrial innovations in the original Federal 
Rules, “[t]hey mark the highest point so far reached in the English speaking world 
in the elimination of secrecy in the preparation for trial”). 
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resolution of controversies on the merits.39  Professor Stephen Subrin 
has chronicled the narrowly circumscribed access to discovery in 
American and British courts before the promulgation of the original 
Federal Rules.40  He notes that Edson R. Sunderland, the principal 
drafter of the discovery provisions of the original Federal Rules, drew 
from discovery tools available in various states and ultimately 
incorporated in the Federal Rules an amalgam of virtually every type 
of discovery provision, often discarding constraints that limited a 
particular discovery device.41  The resulting Rules included an 
impressive array of discovery devices that were much broader in scope 
than any existing state procedural system and were fully equipped to 
meet the goal of uncovering the truth and facilitating resolution of 
cases on the merits.42  
The liberal discovery provisions of the original Federal Rules, 
thus, exhibited the normative goal of achieving correct substantive 
outcomes as well as the trans-substantive nature of the Federal Rules.  
The discovery rules applied to all cases, regardless of subject matter 
or case size, by relying on highly generalized rules that remitted many 
procedural issues to the discretion of judges in individual cases.43  The 
trans-substantive premise that discovery could be had regarding “any 
matter, not privileged, which [was] relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action,”44  paralleled the general purpose of 
the Federal Rules to enable the deserving party to prevail in the case.  
																																								 																				
39. Freedman, supra note 2, at 175; Subrin, supra note 11, at 716 (enumerating 
the benefits claimed for broad discovery, which include: “elimination of surprise; 
preserving testimony so it will be available in case of the death or other 
unavailability of a witness; diminishing the importance of pleadings; increasing ‘the 
effectiveness of the summary judgment’; focusing the trial on ‘the main points in 
controversy’; and permitting each side to assess the strengths and weaknesses of 
their cases in advance, frequently making trials unnecessary because of informed 
settlement” (quoting Edson R. Sunderland, Improving the Administration of Civil 
Justice, 167 ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 60, 74–75 (1933)). 
40. Subrin, supra note 11, at 694, 698–705. 
41. Id. at 714–19; Subrin, supra note 1, at 30–33. 
42. Subrin, supra note 11, at 719.  
43. Bone, supra note 21, at 1972; Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of 
Complexity—Complex Litigation: Cases and Materials on Advanced Civil 
Procedure, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1473–74 (1987); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean 
Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 
1613 (2014). 
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (1970) (amended 1970) (providing scope of discovery 
for depositions). 
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It also gave clear direction to district courts—judges were to enforce 
broad discovery in all cases.  The original federal rulemakers, 
therefore, made the normative decision that courts were to provide 
broad and liberal discovery sufficient to permit the uncovering of all 
relevant, non-privileged information.  
Broad discovery, moreover, gave primary emphasis to 
enforcing the substantive goals of the governing law.45  In some cases, 
the commitment to broad discovery increased the cost or length of the 
case, but the original rulemakers apparently accepted such 
consequences as appropriate costs of enhancing just outcomes.46  They 
probably also thought that cases would remain relatively small, thus 
limiting discovery costs.47  Notwithstanding a subsequent growth in 
types and sizes of cases, the procedural system created under the 
original Federal Rules, including its provision for liberal discovery, 
worked relatively well through the 1970s.48  
Increased litigation in the 1970s, largely based on use of the 
statutory private enforcement provisions created by Congress and 
class-action lawsuits made possible by the 1966 revisions to Rule 23, 
however, resulted in calls to address the rising numbers of cases and 
the supposedly excessive litigation costs.49  In response, in 1976, 
Chief Justice Burger convened the Pound Conference,  titled, “Causes 
of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,” which 
focused on overcrowded courts, excessive litigation, and the costs and 
delays of litigation.50  The conference was a critical element of what 
would later be referred to as the “counterrevolution of the late 
																																								 																				
45. See Bone, supra note 21, at 1981 (indicating that the “primary goal of 
procedure is to produce outcomes that enforce the substantive law properly”). 
46. See Bone, supra note 18, at 293 n.26 (discussing that the original 
rulemakers might not have foreseen the broad discovery associated with complex 
litigation and may have been content with expanding discovery because they 
thought it would reduce costs by encouraging settlement). 
47. Id. 
48. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 45, at 1586–87 (noting that the 
statutory private enforcement provisions and the broadened class action rule of 1966 
led to increased litigation). 
49. Id. at 1547, 1587–48, 1587–88; Carrington, supra note 9, at 601–02, 605–
06. 
50. Reda, supra note 12, at 1091–92. 
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[t]wentieth [c]entury’s discovery reform movements.”51  The 1970s 
had brought claims of excessive litigation and discovery abuse, and, 
as a consequence, the liberal discovery principle of the original 
Federal Rules came under attack.52  The Pound Conference produced 
a number of recommendations for improving litigation and provided 
them to the “Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force” for further 
refinement.53  The Follow-Up Task Force made recommendations that 
would introduce “fundamental changes” into the justice system, 
including recommendations to improve judicial case management and 
restrict discovery in order to address the perceived problems of 
excessive litigation costs and discovery abuse.54  
Empirical evidence consistently establishing that discovery 
costs were not excessive, except in a small group of complex, high-
stakes cases,55 did not dispel the notions of excessive discovery costs.  
Thus, from the 1980s to the present, calls for litigation and discovery 
reform spurred successive Federal Rule amendments aimed at 
broadening judicial case management authority and restricting 
discovery.  In 1983, for instance, Rule 26(b)(1) was amended to add 
the first “proportionality” limitations on discoverable information to 
the Federal Rules.  The proportionality factors were not included in 
the definition of discoverable material, which continued to provide 
that parties could obtain discovery “regarding any matter, not 
																																								 																				
51. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: 
Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 537–38 (2001). 
52. Id. at 542–43. 
53. William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A 
Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 279–
80, 288–90 (1977). 
54. Reda, supra note 12, at 1094 (citing AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE 
POUND CONFERENCE FOLLOW–UP TASK FORCE (1976), reprinted in 74 F.R.D. 159, 
191 (1976)). 
55. See, e.g., John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 
84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 552 (2000) (“Discovery problems were . . . much more likely 
to be reported in cases with higher stakes. . . . Where a lot of money is at stake, 
where the issues involve personal injury or matters of principle, where the 
relationships are contentious and the issues complex, here we see more discovery 
and more problems with discovery.”) (quoting	 THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., 
FEDERAL PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: A CASE BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
COUNSEL IN CLOSED FEDERAL CIVIL CASES 21 (1997)); Amelia F. Burroughs, 
Comment, Mythed It Again: The Myth of Discovery Abuse and Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(1), 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 75, 75–76 (2001); Reda, supra note 12, 
at 1088–90.  
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privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action.”56  Instead, the proportionality factors were included 
in a subsequent paragraph that permitted courts to limit the “frequency 
or use of discovery methods” if it determined that certain discovery-
limiting principles had been established:57  
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery 
methods set forth in subdivision (a) shall be limited by 
the court if it determines that  
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably 
cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from 
some other source that is more convenient, less 
burdensome, or less expensive;  
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample 
opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the 
information sought; or  
(iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or 
expensive, taking into account the needs of the 
case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the 
parties’ resources, and the importance of the issues 
at stake in the litigation. The court may act on its 
own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to 
a motion under subdivision (c).58 
Though these restricting principles permitted both increased 
judicial discretion to manage cases and broader authority to limit 
discovery, the provisions were rarely used.  Commentators have 
attributed the ineffectiveness of the proportionality factors to parties’ 
																																								 																				
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (amended 1993). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. The 1983 amendments also added Rule 28(g), which provided that an 
attorney’s signature on discovery requests, responses, and objections constituted 
various certifications regarding the discovery, some of which paralleled the new 
proportionality limitations, and which also provided sanctions for violations of the 
certifications. Id. 
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strategic reluctance to involve judges in discovery issues, the inability 
of parties to convey complete information to judges about discovery 
disputes, and the complexity of the proportionality factors, as well as 
to insufficient information about the merits of the case at the time of 
discovery.59  Additional changes seeking to curb discovery and 
litigation expenses were implemented in 1993.  For the purposes of 
this Article, the most relevant change was the moving of the 
proportionality limitations from their location in Rule 26(b)(1) to Rule 
26(b)(2).60 
In 2000, additional discovery amendments narrowed the 
scope-of-discovery provision of Rule 26(b)(1).  This time, the 
narrowing was based on a proposal originally put forth by the 
American College of Trial Lawyers in 1977 and subsequently 
renewed by the American Bar Association Section on Litigation.61  
Under this amendment, the scope of discovery that parties could 
obtain without a court order was reduced from all non-privileged 
matter relevant to the “subject matter involved in the action,” to all 
information relevant to “any party’s claim or defense.”62  Under the 
amendment, parties could still obtain information relevant to the 
“subject matter” of the action, but only on motion and a showing of 
“good cause.”63  This amendment, like other discovery amendments 
																																								 																				
59. See e.g., Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal But Could 
Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE 
L.J. 889, 905, 911–26 (2009) (concluding that proportionality balancing has not 
worked well because the balance requires information about the merits of the case, 
which is not available at the time that the judge makes discovery decisions and 
which also cannot be communicated well to the judge); Singer, supra note 12, at 
147–48, 180–86 (concluding that proportionality limits on discovery have been 
ineffective because of the parties’ strategic reluctance to submit discovery issues to 
judges; the “unavoidable information gap” that arises from the parties’ inability to 
convey complete  information about discovery disputes to judges; and the 
complexity of the proportionality factors). 
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). Other changes included the addition of initial 
disclosures to Rule 26(a)(1) and the inclusion of presumptive limits on 
interrogatories and depositions. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a); FED. 
R. CIV. P. 30(a). 
61. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole?: The 2000 
Limitation on the Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REV.  13, 15 & n.12 
(2001). 
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2010) (amended 2010). 
63. Id. 
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since 1983, sought to rein in discovery costs and provide greater 
judicial supervision of discovery.64 
Section III completes this review of the evolution of the 
discovery rules by examining the 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1), 
which introduce proportionality balancing as part of the definition of 
the scope of discovery and implement other changes that appear to 
limit the scope of available discovery.  
III. CASE-SPECIFIC DECISIONS ON PROPORTIONALITY TAKE 
CENTER STAGE 	
The 2015 Rule Amendments reveal the continued commitment 
of the Advisory Committee to proportional discovery and early, active 
judicial management of cases.65  A primary component of this 
commitment is the amendment’s relocation of the existing 
proportionality factors from Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) to the scope-of-
discovery provision in Rule 26(b)(1).66  In a memorandum explaining 
the proposals to return the proportionality factors to Rule 26(b)(1), 
Judge David G. Campbell, Chair of the Advisory Committee on the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, underscored that reasonable and 
proportionate discovery has been a goal under the Federal Rules for 
over thirty years.67  Indeed, Judge Campbell emphasized that “three 
previous Civil Rules Committees in three different decades have 
reached the same conclusion as the current Committee—that 
																																								 																				
64. Rowe, supra note 64, at 16.  See also id. at 20–21, 24–27, 29–30 
(concluding, based on then-available decisions, that discovery had not been 
diminished appreciably by Rule amendments precluding “subject matter” discovery 
absent a motion and showing of good cause because, among other things, of the 
parties’ ability to plead claims and defenses on information and belief; court reliance 
on material in the Committee Note that seemed to permit borderline issues to be 
characterized as relevant to a claim or defense; the courts’ continuing reliance on 
general principles of broad and liberal discovery; and the courts’ reliance on the 
provision of Rule 26(b)(1) that permitted discovery of information “reasonably 
calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence”). 
65. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-4 to B-6.  
66. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at 
B-7 to B-8.   
67. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-6. 
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proportionality is an important and necessary feature of civil litigation 
in federal courts.”68  In the 2015 Rule Amendments, the advisory 
committee pursued the goal of proportionality by installing the 
proportionality factors as “an explicit component of the scope of 
discovery, [thus,] requiring parties and courts alike to consider them 
when pursuing discovery and resolving discovery disputes.”69  
In this Part, I acknowledge the importance of discovery that is 
proportional to the needs of a case.  I conclude, however, that the  2015 
Rule Amendments remove the default of liberal discovery, and fail to 
replace it with a guiding touchstone or clear principle for parties to 
reference when negotiating discovery boundaries or for judges to 
consider in making proportionality decisions.70   Rule 26(b)(1) thus 
seeks to achieve discovery proportionate to the needs of each case by 
permitting case-specific balancing.  In doing so, however, it sacrifices 
the use of either a trans-substantive background principle or a set of 
guiding principles that could provide direction to parties negotiating 
the extent of discovery and to judges making proportionality decisions 
and which could also counterbalance the federal courts’ institutional 
limitations when required to craft case-specific procedures.71  In Part 
																																								 																				
68. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-8. 
69. Id. 
70. Although I concentrate primarily on the incompatibility of the balancing 
test with the institutional competence of federal court judges, I note as well that the 
absence of a normative decision, or set of decisions, by the Advisory Committee 
establishing a default or a set of guidelines for making the proportionality 
calculation, means that parties, who will also be in the trenches in determining the 
proportionality issue, have no baseline for negotiating the scope of discovery. See, 
e.g., Subrin, supra note 2, at 89–90, 94 (discussing the importance to parties of 
predictability of discovery); Singer, supra note 12, at 181–84 (defining 
predictability as a core value of civil litigation). Likewise, Professor Bone has 
concluded that Rule 1, which is “meant to guide [the trial judge’s] discretion in 
socially productive ways,” has today become vague and misleading because it fails 
to make the value choices that could provide guidance to judges regarding whether 
and when to pursue the conflicting goals of just outcomes, speed, and inexpensive 
litigation. Bone, supra note 18, at 288–89, 292–97. 
71. Marcus, supra note 21, at 1195, 1228–33 (recognizing that trans-
substantive procedural rules provide a means of counterbalancing the institutional 
limitations of the federal courts, including limitation of lawmaking authority, 
competence (including the ability to obtain complete information and evaluate it 
empirically), and uniformity); see also Burbank, supra note 45, at 1473–76 (noting 
that the case-specific approach encompassed in the new trend for the rules of 
procedure does not produce a higher likelihood that the party’s substantive rights 
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III(A), I discuss the amendment to insert case-specific balancing of 
proportionality factors as the primary determinant of the scope of 
discovery, and in Part III(B), I discuss other changes to Rule 26(b)(1) 
that narrow discovery.   
A. Proportionality Returns to Rule 26(b)(1) 
The Advisory Committee correctly highlights that 
proportionality in discovery has been pursued by federal rulemakers 
in three previous decades.72  The  Committee Note, however, spends 
more time establishing that using proportionality factors to define the 
scope of discovery is not new, than it spends justifying the 
appropriateness of limiting discovery scope through case-specific 
balancing of multiple factors.73  In Part III(A)(1), I discuss the 
Advisory Committee’s purpose for relocating the proportionality 
standard to Rule 26(b)(1).  In Part III(A)(2), I focus on the textual 
changes and the explanatory material regarding proportionality in the 
Committee Note.  
1. Proportionality in Discovery: 
1983 to the Present 
The  Committee Note points out that in 1983, federal 
rulemakers added the proportionality factors to Rule 26(b)(1), which 
ultimately came to be referred to as the “proportionality rule.”74  
Intended to reduce “overdiscovery” and “redundant or 
																																								 																				
will be achieved). Some commentators also favor dispensing with the trans-
substantive principle for discovery and replacing it with a set of procedures that 
cover a wide range of cases that would then be supplemented by additional 
substance–specific protocols. See supra note 44 (explaining the need to supplement 
discovery rules with substantive-specific protocols to truly achieve proportionality). 
This combination of discovery practices would also provide policymaking restraint 
on judges’ discovery decisions and address the institutional limits of the federal 
courts. 
72. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-7, B-16 to B-19 
(providing the text of the amended Committee Note, which traces the history of the 
proportionality factors in the discovery rules). 
73. Id. 
74. Id.; Singer, supra note 12, at 179. 
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disproportionate discovery” as well as “to encourage judges to be 
more aggressive in identifying and discouraging discovery overuse,”75 
the 1983 proportionality factors permitted courts to limit discovery 
upon determining that “the discovery [was] unduly burdensome or 
expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in 
controversy, limitations on the parties’ resources, and the importance 
of the issues at stake in the litigation.”76  
In an ensuing reorganization of Rule 26(b) in 1993, these 
proportionality factors were moved from Rule 26(b)(1) to Rule 
26(b)(2)(C)(iii).77  The 1993 amendments also added two new 
factors—“whether ‘the burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit’ and ‘the importance of the proposed 
discovery in resolving the issues.’”78  Additionally, the 1993 
Committee Note stressed the continued importance of proportionality 
in limiting discovery, providing that “the revisions in Rule 26(b)(2) 
are intended to provide the court with broader discretion to impose 
additional restrictions on the scope and extent of discovery.”79  
By 2000, the Advisory Committee came to believe that courts 
were not using the proportionality “limitations” as contemplated80 and 
added a sentence in Rule 26(b)(1) to alert litigators and courts to the 
existence of the proportionality factors and to highlight their 
importance in determining appropriate limits on discovery.81  Despite 
these efforts, survey results of attorneys and judges shared at the 2010 
Duke Civil Litigation Conference82 led the Advisory Committee to 
																																								 																				
75. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-7, B-37 to B-38. 
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (1993) (amended 1993); see also Judge Campbell 
Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-37 (discussing the intent and substance of the 
1983 provisions). 
77. Id. 
78. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-7. 
79. See id. (discussing the 1993 revision of Rule 26(b)(2)). 
80. Id.; accord Moss, supra note 62, at 905; Singer, supra note 12, at 180–88. 
81. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2000) (amended 2000) (adding the following text 
to Rule 26(b)(1): “All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 
26(b)(2)(C)”); see also Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-7, B-19, 
B-39 (discussing the purpose of the 2000 Rule 26 amendment). 
82. The Advisory Committee organized a Conference on Civil Litigation that 
was held at Duke University Law School and has come to be called the “Duke 
Conference.” The purpose of the conference was to seek “better means to achieve 
[Fed. R. Civ. P.] 1’s goal of just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action.” Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-1 to B-2; see also 
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conclude that additional proportionality in discovery was needed and 
that returning the proportionality factors to Rule 26(b)(1) and making 
other amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) would improve discovery.83  
These survey results seem contrary to consistent empirical studies 
revealing that discovery is not disproportionately costly, except in a 
small percentage of high-value, complex cases.84  
2. Proportionality as the Primary 
Constraint on Discoverable 
Matter 
As noted above, the 2015 Rule Amendments return the 
proportionality factors to Rule 26(b)(1) and insert the factors as an 
element of the definition of the scope of discoverable matter in order 
																																								 																				
Gensler & Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 645, 647–50 (discussing the goal of the Duke 
Conference).  The Advisory Committee ultimately reported “near–unanimous 
agreement . . . that the disposition of civil actions could be improved by advancing 
cooperation among parties, proportionality in the use of available procedures, and 
early judicial case management.” Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at 
B-2. The Advisory Committee ultimately created two subcommittees, including the 
“Duke Subcommittee” that was charged with considering recommendations 
resulting from the 2010 Duke Conference. Id. The Advisory Committee developed 
proposed amendments with the assistance of the Duke Subcommittee, which 
included (1) proposed numerical limits on discovery that were later withdrawn; (2) 
proposed amendments to Rule 26(b)(1); (3) recognition in Rule 26(c)(1) that “the 
allocation of expenses” may be included as a term of a protective order; (4) 
amendments to Rule 34 regarding “specificity” of objections to requests for 
production of documents or electronically stored information, a provision 
specifically permitting parties to produce copies of documents or ESI and a 
requirement that parties state whether they are withholding documents based on 
objections made; (5) a provision for early discovery requests; and (6) amendments 
to Rules 4 and 16 to permit earlier judicial case management.  Id. at B-4 to B-14. 
83. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, B-6 to B-7. See also Gensler 
& Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 645–66 (concluding that the Duke Conference 
resulted in “clear and broad consensus,” based on complaints regarding the length 
and cost of cases, that procedure should be changed to “increase judicial engagement 
and supervision in the cases that need it, when it is needed”).  
84. See supra note 12 (citing multiple sources of empirical research on the cost 
of discovery). 
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to increase proportionality and enhance judicial management.85  
Interestingly, neither the Rule text nor the Committee Note reference 
discovery costs or discovery abuse as a basis for making the 
proportionality factors a critical component of the scope of 
permissible discovery.  Instead, the Committee Note indicates that 
proportionality itself has become the goal.86  “Proportional” 
discovery, however, embraces two elements – (1) normative standards 
defining the desired balance between substantive justice and efficient 
and cost-effective discovery (or other procedural goals); and (2) a 
process for attaining the desired normative standards.  The 
amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) do not articulate the normative 
standards for achieving proportional discovery, but provide only a 
process—the balancing of proportionality factors—for determining 
whether to permit discovery.  Rule 26(b)(1), thus, requires parties and 
judges, in each case, to first make unguided value choices about 
whether to privilege substantive outcomes or less costly litigation (or 
other procedural goals) and then to use the results of that value 
determination to guide decisions regarding the extent of permissible 
discovery.  
Under Rule 26(b)(1), the scope of permissible discovery will 
be measured by whether the material is relevant, non-privileged, and 
“proportional to the needs of the case,”—considering the following 
factors: 
																																								 																				
85. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at 
B-8 (concluding, as part of the basis for returning the proportionality factors to Rule 
26(b)(1), that “proportionality is an important and necessary feature of civil 
litigation in federal courts. . . . [but it] is still lacking in too many cases.”); see also 
Gensler & Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 647–48 (noting the general belief that the 
rules themselves are sound, but in practice, their application could be more 
consistent). 
86. See supra notes 80–84, and accompanying text. The Advisory Committee 
Report dated June 14, 2014, emphasizes proportionality as the goal of discovery. 
See Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-2 to B-3, B-5 to B-6 
(indicating the conclusion in reports prepared for the Duke Conference: 
“[p]roportionality should be the most important principle applied to all discovery” 
and that three prior Advisory Committees had concluded that “proportionality is an 
important and necessary feature of civil litigation in federal courts”). The only 
suggestions that the purpose of proportionality standard is to control discovery costs 
or respond to discovery abuse appears in instances in which the Committee Note 
references or quotes prior Committee Notes that accompanied previous discovery 
Rule Amendments. Id. at B-37 to B-39, B-41.  
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(1) the importance of the issues at stake in the action; 
(2) the amount in controversy; 
(3) the parties’ relative access to relevant information; 
(4) the parties’ resources; 
(5) the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues; 
and 
(6) whether the burden or expense of the proposed 
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.87  
Combined with other 2015 amendments to the scope-of-
discovery provision,88 Rule 26(b)(1) completes the elimination of the 
default discovery principle of broad and liberal discovery that was 
established with the adoption of the original Federal Rules. The 
amendment substitutes proportionality for substantive outcomes as the 
normative principle of highest priority, but neither the text of Rule 
26(b)(1) nor the Committee Note supplies a normative default 
principle to govern the proportionality balance in most cases or even 
																																								 																				
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), see Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, 
at B-8. Rule 26(b) provides as follows: 
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the 
scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery 
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s 
claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering 
the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in 
controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the 
parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the 
issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit.  
This amended language includes one new proportionality factor—“the parties’ 
relevant access to relevant information.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see Judge 
Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-8. 
88. See infra notes 113–126, and accompanying text. 
678 THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION [Vol. 34:4 
 
 
	
a subset of cases.  Thus, the  definition of discoverable matter lacks 
the predictability that many conclude is vital to discovery.89  It is 
possible to view the proportionality amendment and other 2015 Rule 
Amendments that slim the text of Rule 26(b)(1) and the scope of 
discovery as creating a default of less discovery.90  The proportionality 
limits were certainly born of a conviction that their consistent 
application would limit discovery abuse and, thus, discovery costs.91  
They have been nurtured over the years by continued contentions that 
judicial case management, including judicially-set, case-specific 
discovery limits, would curb high discovery costs and discovery 
abuse.92 
Nevertheless, neither the text of Rule 26(b)(1) nor the 
Committee Note supplies an explicit default to less discovery.  To the 
contrary, the text provides factors that may tug toward either more or 
less discovery (or in both directions), given the context of the case.  
This explicitly remits the decision regarding breadth of discovery to 
trial courts (and, of course, to the negotiating strength of litigating 
parties) in particular cases.  In this way, the proportionality standard 
invites district court judges to make normative decisions about the 
claims at issue.  For example, in a given case, the first factor—“the 
importance of the issues at stake in the action”—may conflict with the 
second, “the amount in controversy.”  A judge must determine 
whether the issues are important, and, if so, how important.  The judge 
must then weigh that level of perceived importance against the amount 
in controversy, and, of course, must determine whether that amount is 
high, low, or somewhere in between.  Opinions will differ.  Indeed, 
the determination of the importance of the issue involves a judicial 
policy determination regarding the importance of particular 
																																								 																				
89. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 26, at 918; (criticizing the management model 
for its failure to sufficiently defend the strength of trial judges’ procedure-making 
abilities); Subrin, supra note 2, at 89–90, 94 (discussing the importance to parties of 
predictability of discovery); Singer, supra note 12, at 181–84. 
90. See infra notes 113–126, and accompanying text. 
91. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-8. See also Singer, 
supra note 12, at 177–78 (discussing the goals associated with revising the 
proportionality factors from the Rules). 
92. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-8; see also Burroughs, 
supra note 58, at 83–84 (noting that, except in a rare number of high stakes cases, 
discovery expenses are generally not excessively high). 
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substantive claims, and the weighing of issue “importance” against 
amount in controversy involves another value determination.93  
Discussion of the potential conflict between these two factors 
in the 2015 Committee Note restates the “caution” of the 1983 
Committee Note that “monetary stakes are only one factor” for courts 
to consider and underscores the substantive impact that scope-of-
discovery decisions may have.94  The 1983 Committee Note 
emphasized that, in addition to the monetary stakes at issue, judges 
must consider various other measures of issue importance: 
[T]he significance of the substantive issues, [may be] 
measured in philosophic, social, or institutional terms. 
Thus the rule recognizes that many cases in public 
policy spheres, such as employment practices, free 
speech, and other matters may have importance far 
beyond the monetary amount involved.95   
The 2015 Committee Note adds to that caution, recognizing 
that “[m]any other substantive areas also may involve litigation that 
seeks relatively small amounts of money, or no money at all, but that 
seeks to vindicate vitally important personal or public values.”96  
Thus, the 2015 version of Rule 26(b)(1) and the 2015 Committee Note 
																																								 																				
93. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-41 to B-42; see 
Burbank & Subrin, supra note 10, at 405–06 (emphasizing the “attack on democracy 
[that] results from [procedure that] undercut[s] the effectiveness of congressional 
statutes designed to compensate citizens for injury or to enable private enforcement 
of important social norms”); Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and 
Economics of Proportionality in Discovery 16–17 (Univ. of Pa. Inst. For Law & 
Econ., Research Paper No. 15-1, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2551520 (offering suggestions for judges in weighing relative factors); 
Moss, supra note 62, at 912–13 (suggesting that the “amount in controversy” and 
“importance of the issues” analysis are uncertain at the time of any decision under 
the proportionality rule); Singer, supra note 12, at 180–86 (noting that the 
unpredictability of proportionality determinations complicate the analysis of the 
utility of the proportionality rule); see also John L. Carroll, Proportionality in 
Discovery: A Cautionary Tale, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 455, 464–66 (2010) 
(suggesting that proportionality is underutilized).   
94. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-8, B-41 to B-42. 
95. Id. at B-41 to B-42. 
96. Id.  
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suggest that, in cases involving “philosophic, social, or institutional” 
issues and in cases seeking to “vindicate vitally important personal or 
public values,” the importance of the issues at stake may outweigh the 
monetary stake and, presumably, other factors.97  Neither, however, 
requires this balance for any particular substantive claim, ostensibly 
leaving the decision to the unguided discretion of each district court 
judge and the parties in each case, though these are the precise types 
of value judgments that vary by individual judge and on which the 
parties generally assume diametrically-opposed views.  
The Rule or the Committee Note should have established 
normative guidelines, balancing priorities, or more helpful factors to 
prevent judges from encroaching on the substantive prerogatives of 
Congress or state policymakers.  For instance, for cases in which 
Congress has created “statutory fee-shifting or damage-enhancement 
provisions,”98 Congress has indicated a normative commitment to the 
substantive claim at issue and has indicated, moreover, that costs 
should not be the overriding consideration. The Rule text or 
Committee Note could have indicated, in these cases, that courts 
should default to permitting discovery of all non-privileged matter 
relevant to the claim or defense of any party (or to the subject matter 
of the claims in the action), thus, explicitly indicating a high level of 
deference to congressional policy determinations and removing the 
burden of the initial value choice before proportionality balancing.99  
Such a guideline would have left ample room for case-based discretion 
under proportionality balancing, but would have (1) relieved the 
federal district courts, which have limited substantive lawmaking 
authority, from having to make normative discovery decisions that 
could undermine congressional policy choices, and (2) facilitated 
																																								 																				
97.	 Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-41 to B-42. 
98. See supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined. to Error! Bookmark not 
defined., and accompanying text. 
99. See Stephen B. Burbank, Proportionality and the Benefits of Discovery: 
Out of Sight and Out of Mind?, 34 REV. LITIG. 647, 654 (2015) (expressing concern 
that the  the 2015 Rule Amendments could lead to an emphasis of cost over benefits); 
Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 96, at 6; see also Subrin, supra note 12, at 400 
(suggesting that drafters should consider parties’ time limitations); Burbank & 
Subrin, supra note 10, at 405–06, 411 (2011) (discussing Congress’s use of private 
enforcement actions to aid in enforcement of important social goals and 
recommending that such actions be exempted from any “simple track” procedural 
options that provide for lesser discovery). 
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increased uniformity for claims that Congress has identified as 
favored. 
Further, even assuming that the importance-of-the-issues 
factor and the amount-in-controversy factor were aligned or were 
otherwise determined to favor broad or relatively broad (whatever that 
compromise might mean) discovery, courts might conclude that other 
factors listed in the Rule 26(b)(1) proportionality balance favor lesser 
discovery, such as the extent of “the parties’ resources,” the 
“importance of the discovery in resolving the issues,” or “whether the 
burden or expense of discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”100  In 
fact, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues would 
seem to be quite important in resolving proportionality issues.  As is 
discussed below, however, complete information on this factor will be 
hard to obtain because, among other factors, parties often lack 
information early in the case and fail to realize the full importance of 
the information they do have.  These additional factors may point in 
different directions in any single case.  The 2015 Committee Note, 
however, sheds little light on the priority or weight to be accorded to 
these factors or on the situations in which each should be considered 
more highly.101  
																																								 																				
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
101. With respect to the “extent of resources” factor, one would generally 
expect that discovery should be commensurate with resources under a 
proportionality principle, but the Committee Note hastens to provide also that 
discovery may be directed “to an impecunious” party and that discovery directed to 
“a wealthy party” would not be “unlimited.” Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra 
note 13, at B-42. With respect to the importance of the discovery in resolving issues 
in the case, the Committee Note indicates that the producing party may not have 
information about the importance of the discovery, but it does not address the very 
common circumstance in which a requesting party may not have a full appreciation 
of the uses for the discovery until he receives the discovery or until later in the case. 
See id. at B-42.  Similarly, the Committee Note acknowledges, with respect to the 
burden or expense of discovery, that this information may not be available at the 
beginning of the case, and that the responding party may have the only information 
about this factor. See id. at B-40. But, the Committee Note makes no reference to 
the recognized inclination of parties to withhold information, especially before 
access to discovery can level the information playing field. See infra notes 140–141, 
and accompanying text. 
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The Committee Note does, by contrast, provide relatively clear 
guidance regarding the parties’ “relative access to relevant 
information,” a new factor that provides “explicit focus” on cases 
involving “information asymmetry.”102  The Committee Note 
indicates that in some cases, one party will have large amounts of 
information, while the other party has limited information.103  The 
Committee Note acknowledges that some of the information may be 
easily accessed while some may be more difficult to access, and 
concludes simply that “these circumstances often mean that the burden 
of responding to discovery lies heavier on the party who has more 
information.”104  The Committee Note carefully leaves the decision 
for individual cases, but the clear import is that in most cases involving 
information asymmetry, the party lacking information should be 
permitted significant discovery.  
Further hindering a district court in making the proportionality 
analysis are the following considerations: parties may have imperfect 
information regarding the factors, may not comprehend fully the 
import of the information in the initial stages of discovery, and will 
often evaluate each factor differently, arguing for contradictory 
conclusions on each factor.105  The 2015 Committee Note, again, 
provides little direction on how to ameliorate these imbalances and 
differences, concluding, instead, that it will be “[t]he court’s 
responsibility, using all the information provided by the parties, . . . to 
consider . . . all the . . . factors in reaching a case-specific 
determination of the appropriate scope of discovery”106 and that the 
“burden or expense of proposed discovery should be determined in a 
realistic way.”107 
In short, the 2015 Committee Note is careful not to urge 
limited discovery or to premise the proportionality balance on an 
intent to curb either discovery abuse or excessive costs in discovery.  
Instead, it steadfastly remits decisions on discovery scope to a 
determination of proportionality in the context of each particular case.  
																																								 																				
102. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-40. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at B-40 to B-41 (emphasis added). 
105. See Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 96 at 13 (recognizing that courts 
will have to make difficult judgment calls as to the assignment of weight for more 
subjective factors); see also infra notes 139–142, and accompanying text. 
106. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-40. 
107. Id. at B-42. 
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The benefit of the proportionality standard is that it permits district 
court judges to create reasonable, case-specific discovery boundaries.  
This coincides with Professor Subrin’s observation that one discovery 
size does not fit all.108  The disadvantages of the proportionality 
principle are (1) that it permits judges to privilege either the 
substantive claim at issue or fiscal factors over substantive interests; 
and (2) that, given the institutional limitations of the federal courts, 
which I discuss below,109 district court judges may not be particularly 
good at making these case-specific determinations. 
In summary, instead of serving as a means to an articulated 
procedural goal or value, “proportionality”—which privileges case-
specific discretion—has itself become the goal of Rule 26(b)(1).  
Indeed, the Advisory Committee Report concludes that “[s]ince the 
[Duke] conference, the Committee and others have sought to promote 
cooperation, proportionality, and active judicial case management.”110  
More emphatically, the Advisory Committee reported at the 
conclusion of the Duke Conference that “[p]roportionality should be 
the most important principle applied to all discovery.”111  Of course, 
cooperation, proportionality, and active case management may be 
goals in themselves.  Conversely, they may be a means of achieving 
other desired objectives of litigation, such as efficient and cost-
effective litigation in federal courts for the litigating parties, or 
sufficient evidence production to ensure that the proper party prevails.  
As used in support of procedural goals like these, the terms 
“cooperation,” “proportionality,” and “active case management” 
would provide some guidance.  
When used as the goal itself, a requirement that discovery be 
“proportional” based on factors that may cut in different directions in 
different cases reduces, at best, to a requirement that discovery be 
reasonable, and, at worst, to unguided discretion to privilege cost 
considerations, substantive outcomes, or other procedural values.  
																																								 																				
108. Subrin, supra note 12, at 378 (concluding that the trans-substantive 
discovery model should be “readjusted” and suggesting a “simpler procedural track 
for some cases and non-binding protocols for discovery and other procedural 
incidents for some of the more expansive and expensive case-types”). 
109. See infra notes 127–138 and accompanying text.  
110. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-2 to B-3.  
111. Id. at B-6. 
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Reasonable or “proportional” discovery is a worthy goal, but, unlike 
the clear discovery objective in the original Federal Rules,112 it is not 
one that provides the parties or federal judges with an understanding 
of the guiding procedural values and, thus, of the conduct required or 
the types of orders that should issue in the varying types of claims 
filed in federal courts.   
B. The 2015 Amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) 
Eliminate Remaining Imprints of Liberal 
Discovery 
 In addition to installing proportionality as the principal 
determinant of the scope of discovery, the 2015 amendments to Rule 
26(b)(1) eliminate the remaining vestiges of the liberal discovery 
principle by removing or modifying three provisions of the former 
Rule 26(b)(1) that could support a continuing notion (in at least some 
instances) of a broad discovery default principle.  
First, amended Rule 26(b)(1) removes the nonexclusive 
description of the type of information that is discoverable regarding 
“any party’s claim or defense.”113  Former Rule 26(b)(1) provided, in 
part, as follows: 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s 
claim or defense—including the existence, description, 
nature, custody, condition, and location of any 
documents or other tangible things and the identity and 
location of persons who know of any discoverable 
matter.114 
The italicized language above has been removed from the 
2015 version of Rule 26(b)(1). The relevant portion of the 2015 
Committee Note indicates that this excision removes textual material 
that has been rendered extraneous by common use and understanding, 
noting that discovery of this information is “so deeply entrenched in 
practice that it is no longer necessary to clutter the long text of Rule 
																																								 																				
112. See supra notes 43–48, and accompanying text. 
113. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra 
note 13, at B-42 to B-43. 
114. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014) (emphasis added). 
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26 with these examples.”115  Immediately thereafter, however, the 
Committee Note indicates a discovery-limiting effect of the 
amendment—the Note provides that discovery of this “deeply 
entrenched” matter “should still be permitted” when “relevant and 
proportional to the needs of the case.”116  Thus, the removal of this 
language both makes discovery of this matter subject to the 
proportionality analysis and eliminates textual material courts might 
have relied on in determining whether discovery meets the new 
proportionality requirement.  This amendment, again, underscores that 
proportionality is the key determinant of discoverable information and 
reinforces the perception that the text of Rule 26(b)(1) provides little 
guidance to judges in making the proportionality decision.117 
Second,  amended Rule 26(b)(1) likewise eliminates the 
“reasonably calculated” language, which currently provides that 
parties may discover information that “appears reasonably calculated 
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”118  The full provision 
states:  “Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the 
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence.”119  Amended Rule 26(b)(1) removes this 
“reasonably calculated” qualifier.  The  2015 version of Rule 26(b)(1), 
as discussed above, requires that discoverable matter be relevant, non-
privileged, and proportional to the needs of the case.120 The Rule 
removes the ability to obtain material that “appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” and 
provides, instead, that information that is determined to be 
discoverable—i.e., that is relevant, non-privileged, and within the new 
scope of proportional discovery—“need not be admissible in evidence 
																																								 																				
115. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-43. 
116. Id. (emphasis added). 
117. See Genetin, supra note 24, at 1119–20 (discussing, in the context of 
proposed amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 regarding summary 
judgment, that guidance in the text of the Federal Rules is important to consistent 
application of the Rules). 
118.	 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014).  
119. Id. This language was added to Rule 26(b)(1) in 1948.  See FED. R. CIV. 
P. 26(b) 1948 advisory committee’s note. 
120.	 See supra notes 85–87, and accompanying text. 
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to be discoverable.”121  The first version of the “reasonably 
calculated” language was added to Rule 26(b) in 1946, with the stated 
purpose to “make clear the broad scope” of discovery.122  The 
amendment, by contrast, reinforces restrictions on discoverable 
information.  
Third, amended Rule 26(b)(1) eliminates textual Rule 
recognition of the ability of parties, upon a showing of good cause, to 
obtain discovery relevant to “the subject matter involved in the 
pending action,” thus limiting discovery to information that is relevant 
to “any party’s claim or defense.”123  Although rarely invoked in the 
years since, discovery of material relevant to “subject matter” was 
removed from information automatically available for discovery,124 
this provision for obtaining “subject matter” discovery upon a 
showing of good cause was originally designed by the Advisory 
Committee “to involve the court more actively in regulating the 
breadth of sweeping or contentious discovery.”125  Retention of the 
parties’ ability to obtain discovery relevant to the subject matter of the 
action seems to fully support newly amended Rule 26(b)(1)’s 
increased emphasis on both case-responsive discovery and more 
active judicial management of the discovery process.  Nevertheless, 
the Advisory Committee indicates that discovery of material relevant 
to the parties’ “claims and defenses” should be sufficient, “given a 
proper understanding of what is relevant to a claim or defense.”126  The 
exclusion of “subject matter” discovery, thus, eliminates express 
textual authority to exercise discretion to extend discovery to meet the 
needs of a particular case, while the inclusion of the proportionality 
factors underscores textual authority to limit discovery. 
																																								 																				
121. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, 
at B-30 to B-31. 
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014) & 1948 advisory committee’s note. 
123. Prior to the amendment, Rule 26(b)(1) provided that “[f]or good cause, 
the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved 
in the action.” This language has been removed from Rule 26(b)(1). FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(1); Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-30 to B-31. 
124. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
125. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-9; see also Rowe, 
supra note 64, at 16–17. 
126. Id. at B-43.  See also Rowe, supra note 64, at 20–21, 24–27, 29–30 
(concluding, shortly after promulgation of Rule amendments precluding “subject 
matter” discovery absent a motion and showing of good cause, that there was little 
evidence that the amendment had narrowed discovery appreciably and suggesting 
factors that might account for the limited impact). 
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In summary, the text of amended Rule 26(b)(1), with its 
adoption of a proportionality principle and its excision or restriction 
of other textual provisions, reveals that the transition away from the 
default of broad and liberal discovery in federal procedure is 
complete.  Indeed, three amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) remove or 
revise language in the previous Rule 26(b)(1) and provide further 
evidence of discovery limits.  It may be that the elephant in the Rule 
and Committee Note is an inclination toward—but not a default 
principle of—more limited discovery, a goal that has driven changes 
to the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) discovery provisions since 1983.  
IV. PROPORTIONALITY AND THE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF 
FEDERAL COURTS	
Absent meaningful direction in the text or Committee Note of  
Rule 26(b)(1),127 a district court judge must engage in case-specific 
balancing of the  factors set forth in the Rule. The rulemakers 
purposefully included a wide variety of factors that should be 
considered in crafting proportional discovery.  They also declined, in 
both the Rule text and Committee Note, to provide significant 
guidelines regarding application of most of these factors.128  This 
proportionality amendment might be optimal for decision makers 
who:  (1) gather all information relevant to the scope of discovery 
decisions; (2) invite or require participation by the range of relevant 
stakeholders; (3) spend resources and time assessing results and 
comparing alternatives; and (4) make normative policy decisions 
regarding the substantive claims at issue.  These characteristics, 
however, do not describe federal district court judges, magistrate 
																																								 																				
127. Some judges would not consider Committee Notes, though the Supreme 
Court frequently references them. See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of 
Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
1099, 1141–42, 1152–69 (2002) (noting that proposed Committee Notes go through 
notice-and-comment review along with proposed Rule text, and advocating that 
material in the Committee Notes be accorded “authoritative weight” in interpreting 
Federal Rules). 
128. See infra notes 151–160, and accompanying text, for an analysis of the 
guidance provided in the text of Rule 26(b)(1) and the Committee Note. 
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judges, or their assistants who resolve pretrial issues in particular 
cases.  
Indeed, Professor David Marcus has recognized that trans-
substantive, rather than case-specific, process law helps to 
“ameliorate[] . . . institutional limitations” of federal courts arising 
from limits on their “legitimacy, competency, and effectiveness” in 
creating substance-specific procedure.129  Trans-substantive process 
law would include the textual and background principle of liberal 
discovery across cases, which was a premise of the original discovery 
rules and which supplied clear direction to judges making scope-of-
discovery decisions.  In the current litigation context, many accept that 
broad discovery in all cases is not optimal.  Courts nevertheless 
require some guidance. Professor Robert Bone has concluded that 
when the Federal Rules delegate discretion to judges through multi-
factor balancing tests, rulemakers should provide guidance by limiting 
the available factors, identifying principles that guide decision 
making, or both.130  Such guidance would counterbalance the 
institutional impediments that district court judges will encounter in 
making case-specific, scope-of-discovery decisions using the multi-
factor proportionality standard.  In this Part, I briefly review the 
institutional impediments of federal courts that work to prevent good, 
case-specific decisions regarding proportional discovery, suggest 
means of ameliorating these institutional deficits, and conclude that 
Congress and the Advisory Committee are better suited, 
institutionally, to make these decisions.131 
																																								 																				
129. Marcus, supra note 21, at 1220.  
130. Bone, supra note 21, at 2015–16; Bone, supra note 18, at 300–03; see 
also Burbank, supra note 45, at 1473–74 (suggesting that courts should recognize 
that procedural rules are not neutral and should explicitly identify their impact). 
131. See generally infra Section IV.A.1.  See also  Burbank & Subrin, supra 
note 10, at 412 (recommending that the Advisory Committee, in conjunction with 
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys, fashion discovery protocols for various 
substantive claims, and suggesting that the Advisory Committee probably has the 
authority to do so under the Rules Enabling Act and, if not, recommending that 
Congress should delegate that authority); see also Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen 
Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil Procedure: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1194–1215 (2012) (comparing the 
institutional competencies of the Supreme Court in its adjudicatory capacity and in 
its rulemaking capacity and concluding that rulemaking is the superior policymaking 
tool in most circumstances because it is better suited to making policy, obtaining 
information, permitting broad participation, determining necessary tradeoffs, and 
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A. Institutional Limits of District Courts 
1. Limited Normative Decision 
Making Authority 
Federal district court judges have limited substantive 
lawmaking authority as compared to state lawmakers (including state 
courts) and their political counterparts at the federal level.  When 
determining discovery scope under the proportionality analysis, 
however, district court judges will be required to make numerous 
normative judgments on a regular basis.  As indicated above, the 
individual proportionality factors include elements requiring policy 
decisions, and the ultimate balance of individual factors will require 
additional normative trade-offs and value choices.132   
The first and second factors are among the proportionality 
factors that will require normative decision making and will affect the 
parties’ ability to succeed on different substantive claims.133  The first 
factor requires a judge to determine the importance of the issues and 
will include normative line-drawing regarding the importance of the 
issue to the parties and society.  The second factor requires the judge 
to determine importance based on the monetary value of the claim at 
issue, which also requires a judge to set value-based boundaries.  
																																								 																				
creating comprehensive solutions); Struve, supra note 130, at 1141–42, 1152–69 
(noting that proposed Committee Notes go through notice–and–comment review 
along with proposed Rule text and advocating that material in the Committee Notes 
be accorded “authoritative weight” in interpreting Federal Rules). 
132. See supra notes 93–101, and accompanying text; see also Burbank, 
supra note 99, at 650–51; Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 96, at 12–18; Moss, 
supra note 62, at 896 (in making the proportionality calculation, judges must 
consider both value to the parties and to society).  
133. See generally supra Section III.A.2.  Additionally, even assuming that 
the judge could obtain adequate information to determine an issue’s importance to 
both the parties and society, (which I explore below—see infra notes 142–145) 
judicial policymaking will not end with the judge’s determination of the issue’s 
importance, but will recur as the judge makes further decisions essential to the 
proportionality decision, including whether the amount in controversy (factor 2) 
outweighs the issue’s importance; the extent of discovery to provide parties (often 
plaintiffs) in instances of “information asymmetry” (factor 3); whether the parties’ 
resources (factor 4) justify more or less discovery; and whether the burden or 
expense of discovery (factor 6) outweighs its likely benefit.  
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Other factors, too, will require normative decision making.  Factor 
three, for example, which assesses the extent of parties’ access to 
relevant information and focuses on cases of information asymmetry, 
will inevitably involve a trade-off between one party’s (typically, the 
plaintiff’s) ability to obtain sufficient discovery to prove a claim and 
the opposition’s discovery costs.  These factors implicate the limited 
lawmaking authority of district court judges. 
The decisions may, at the same time, encroach on the 
substantive policy choices of Congress or the states to use private 
adjudication (often in conjunction with administrative enforcement) 
to enforce substantive policy.134  For example, Congress has created 
private attorney general provisions in many statutes and has also 
induced suit through attorney fee provisions and enhanced damages 
awards.135  These provisions represent Congress’s determination that 
the social benefit of enforcing the claim at issue exceeds the private 
benefit and cost of litigation for the individual parties.136  Judicial 
decisions to limit discovery in these cases could encroach on both the 
policy decisions of Congress and the civil enforcement methods 
																																								 																				
134. See e.g., Burbank & Farhang, supra note 45, at 1545, 1547–50 (“[T]he 
choice of private over administrative enforcement may afford protection to 
congressional policy long after the governing majority has been replaced by 
legislators with different preferences.”);  Burbank, Farhang, & Kritzer, supra note 
12, at 640, 644–47 (providing historical background of the increase in federal 
statutory and administrative law and observing that the increase coincided with “the 
federal government’s reliance on private enforcement” ). 
135. See e.g., Subrin, supra note 12, at 395–97 (arguing that trans-substantive 
procedures are not the best fit for the United States); Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer 
supra note 12, at 640 (concluding that “the desirability of authorizing private actions 
involves difficult policy judgments and is likely to depend on a number of context-
specific factors” and that “[m]aking such determinations therefore requires 
familiarity with the nature of the particular policy problem, the substantive goals of 
the regulatory scheme, and the likely interaction of private lawsuits with other 
elements of the government’s enforcement strategy”). 
136. See, e.g., Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 96, at 3 (asserting that courts 
determining the proportionality of discovery should consider “the divergence 
between social and private benefits of discovery, e.g., in litigation with important 
precedential or social value that will not be internalized by the litigants”); Burbank, 
supra note 99, at 651 (concluding that one of the social benefits of private 
enforcement, pursuant to congressional legislation, is the avoidance of the huge 
“expenditures, higher taxes, and bureaucratic state-building that are essential to 
adequate public enforcement.”). 
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selected by Congress.137  Commentators emphasize, moreover, that 
congressional decisions to pursue substantive goals through private 
enforcement often include concurrent decisions not to fund alternative 
public means of enforcing the claims through increased taxes.138  
Consequently, when making proportionality decisions, district 
courts must calculate and weigh the private and social benefits and 
costs.  These calculations will not be easy to make in the context of 
particular cases; the decisions could involve decisions contrary to 
those of Congress and state policymakers; and such decisions will 
often require information that will be unavailable to the parties and the 
judge.   
2. Lack of Access to Information 
Judges, who must rely to a large extent on information from 
the parties, will often lack access to the information necessary to make 
informed decisions when implementing the proportionality 
standard.139  The litigation process thus compares less favorably to 
																																								 																				
137. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 26, at 927 (discussing the limitations of case–
specific rule–making); Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 12, at 648 
(indicating that “those with the power to determine the efficacy of private 
enforcement regimes in action may subvert the policy preferences of the enacting 
Congress”); Moss, supra note 62, at 896; Subrin, supra note 12, at 395–97 
(concluding that “‘[c]alibration of discovery is calibration of the level of 
enforcement of the social policy set by Congress’” (quoting Patrick Higginbotham, 
Foreword, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1997)). 
138. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 99, at 651–52; Burbank & Farhang, supra 
note 45, at 1547–49; Carrington, supra note 9, at 603–06 (concluding that “[a] nation 
that often eschews the idea of strong or intrusive government may require 
[statutorily granted suits by private citizens]. . . to constrain harmful business 
practices”); Subrin, supra note 12, at 387, 396–97. 
139. See Bone, supra note 21, at 1986–2001 (discussing “bounded rationality 
constraints, information access obstacles, and strategic interaction effects” as 
obstacles to a district court judge’s effective “exercise of discretion”); Robert G. 
Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L. REV. 
1155, 1170 (2006) (registering skepticism about delegating broad discretion to 
district court judges, based on doubts that judges “can gather and process the 
information necessary to craft case–specific procedures that produce good outcomes 
in the highly strategic environment of litigation”); Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading 
and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 537, 561 (2009) 
(concluding that the Supreme Court, in the context of judicial interpretation, “is ill 
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other institutions that have broader authority to request or require 
provision of information, such as Congress and the federal rulemakers 
acting under the Rules Enabling Act.  
Further, parties themselves often lack complete information in 
the context of litigating particular cases, thus limiting the judge’s 
ability to make sound normative decisions. Additionally, parties have 
incentives to withhold information,140 further limiting the information 
available to the judge when making complex determinations under the 
proportionality standard.  Moreover, parties will benefit most from 
withholding information early in the case and before the opposing 
party has the ability to obtain that information through discovery.141  
This is precisely the time that the judge formulates his or her initial 
views and makes case management and discovery decisions that often 
dictate the case’s course.  Indeed, because the 2015 amendments to 
the Federal Rules also encourage earlier sharing of information and 
earlier judicial case management, incentives to withhold information 
early in the case could be intensified.  In addition, early discovery 
decisions made on the incomplete information available to the judge 
will impact later stages of the litigation, including the strength of the 
parties’ positions at settlement, summary judgment, and trial.142   
																																								 																				
equipped to gather the range of empirical data, and lacks the practical experience . . . 
that [is] implicated in considering standards for the adequacy of pleadings”); 
Marcus, supra note 21, at 1222–1233 (reviewing trans-substantivity and judicial 
upkeep or process law); Singer, supra note 12, at 183 (discussing the institutional 
limitations that prevent courts from “legitimately, competently, and effectively 
designing substance-specific process law”).  
140. See Bone, supra note 21, at 1990–91, 1993 (noting that withholding 
information is advantageous to parties because it both requires other parties to incur 
costs in obtaining the information and it prolongs any existing information 
asymmetry); Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 96, at 14–15 (noting, regarding the 
access to information factor, that it may be difficult for judges to gauge the extent 
of the producing party’s access to information and that requesting parties will have 
incentives to understate ability to obtain information or to exaggerate the costs of 
obtaining it). 
141 . Bone, supra note 21, at 1990; Moss, supra note 62, at 896.  
142. Bone, supra note 21, at 1993; Bone, supra note 26, at 927; see also Moss, 
supra note 62, at 910–12 (concluding that court decisions regarding proportionality 
are “doomed to be suboptimal” because, inter alia, in applying the proportionality 
standard, courts must consider the probative value of evidence, the size of the case, 
and the likelihood that plaintiff will prevail at trial, but courts cannot make a good 
evaluation of the likelihood of success at trial until they obtain the evidence at issue). 
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Moreover, some information crucial to making a good 
decision under the proportionality standard will not be in the 
possession of the parties.  This includes information regarding the 
social costs and benefits of claims created by Congress and other 
decision makers.  For this type of information, it could be crucial to 
obtain participation of other stakeholders, but litigation provides few 
opportunities to invite or require broad participation.   
Even if judges could obtain complete information, however, 
they would still suffer from a comparative inability to conduct 
empirical assessment of the information, compare their  discovery 
limits to other alternatives, and use that information to inform ultimate 
proportionality decisions.143  Absent sufficient time, information, and 
resources to assess the information empirically, judges will likely 
resort to schemas and heuristics that introduce bias into their decision 
making.144  Moreover, because a single judge acts as the decision 
maker in trials, there are not structural checks and balances that could 
lessen the effect of bias.145  
Finally, case-specific application of the proportionality 
standard will require enormous costs in terms of judicial time and 
effort for results that, given information access and assessment 
limitations, will not be optimal and will result in disuniformity of 
discovery procedure across the federal system.  
3. Little Opportunity for Meaningful Appellate 
Review 
The nature of appellate review in federal courts will also 
ensure little opportunity for meaningful review of district court 
decisions implementing the proportionality standard. Appellate 
review generally supplies corrective oversight and instruction 
regarding controlling legal principles.  Additionally, for issues subject 
																																								 																				
143. Marcus, supra note 21, at 1230; see also Bone, supra note 21, at 1986–
87 (discussing the issues broad discretion creates). 
144. Bone, supra note 18, at 301, 307–08; Bone, supra note 21, at 1987–90; 
Marcus, supra note 21, at 1230. 
145. Bone, supra note 21, at 1989–90; Marcus, supra note 21, at 1231. 
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to an abuse of discretion standard, appellate review may, over time, 
provide guidance by narrowing the scope of permissible discretion.146   
The appellate court’s ability to provide error correction and 
guidance regarding the application of the proportionality standard in 
discovery rulings, however, will be diminished.  First, review will 
often not be available. Discovery issues, which are rarely subject to 
immediate appeal, will often fade in importance as the case progresses 
and will not be appealed.  Second, many cases settle, precluding 
appeal of even important proportionality issues.  Third, even if a case 
is appealed on the application of the proportionality standard, the 
district court’s proportionality decision will typically be reviewed 
under the abuse of discretion standard, which triggers the appellate 
court’s substantial deference to the district court’s determinations.  
These general constraints will limit the opportunity for appellate 
courts to compare various proportionality decisions from the 
laboratory of the district courts, to identify stronger decisions, and to 
impose a level of consistency or uniformity in proportionality 
decisions.  
Moreover, in the event that a party successfully appeals a 
proportionality standard issue, the appellate court’s review will be 
limited by the district court’s record.  That is, the reviewing court’s 
decision will be impacted by the following limitations on the district 
court: lack of access to complete information, parties’ incentives to 
withhold information, and inadequate resources to assess the 
information provided.  These constraints will, in turn, impede the 
ability of appellate courts to provide corrective review or guidance 
regarding proportionality issues.  Finally, federal appellate courts, like 
district courts, have limited substantive lawmaking ability.  Thus, 
appellate decisions, like district court decisions, may encroach upon 
the substantive policy decisions of Congress or other decision makers. 
B. Moving Forward with Proportionality 
Notwithstanding the institutional obstacles that district courts 
and other decision makers will confront in applying the 
proportionality standard, courts will need to apply the standard 
regularly.  In this Part, I conclude that in the short term, district courts 
should defer to the pre-existing policy choices of Congress and other 
																																								 																				
146. Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1561, 1568 (2003). 
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decision makers regarding substantive claims and to the limited 
guidance in Rule 26(b)(1) and in the Committee Note. In the long 
term, the Advisory Committee should reclaim the issue of 
proportionality in discovery and provide guidance by creating general 
discovery procedures to cover the broad run of cases and substance-
specific protocols to govern specific substantive claims.  
In the short term, district courts should conclude that their 
discretion in creating discovery that is proportionate to the substantive 
claims at issue is limited.  Courts should resolve proportionality issues 
against the backdrop of the values underlying the applicable 
substantive law and in light of the values furthered by the judicial 
system. Though the American judicial system promotes many values, 
one of the most important is the goal of resolving cases in accord with 
the substantive rights of the parties.147  Thus, in implementing the 
proportionality standard, courts should determine and enforce the 
policy objectives of Congress and other lawmakers.  The choices of 
other decision makers will not provide definitive guidance regarding 
resolution of all discovery disputes, but they will provide background 
principles to guide decisions in some segments of cases.  Moreover, 
furthering the existing normative choices of Congress and other 
decision makers when making proportionality decisions parallels the 
federal courts’ role, when adjudicating disputes, of enforcing the 
values underlying authoritative texts or otherwise existing in 
practice.148  District courts, thus, should make discovery decisions that 
do not undermine the value choices in existing substantive law.  
																																								 																				
147. E.g., Bone, supra note 18, at 302; Bone, supra note 26, at 913–14. 
148. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 
(1984) (concluding that the role of judges and other court decision makers “is not to 
maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate 
and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution 
and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with them”); 
accord Bone, supra note 18, at 302–03 (“[P]rivate dispute resolution is not the 
primary goal of procedure under any sensible account of American civil 
adjudication. . . . It is meant to enforce the substantive law, and the substantive law 
is meant to further public goals such as deterring socially undesirable behavior and 
providing morally justified compensation.”); see also Bone, supra note 26, at 940–
43, 949 (concluding that both a “rights–based metric” and a “process–based metric” 
for determining procedural issues would support the argument that procedural 
rulemakers should make procedural choices by referring to existing practice of 
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Adherence to normative preferences of other policymakers is 
also consistent with the Advisory Committee’s statement that, in the 
“importance of the issue” factor, the district courts should consider 
“philosophic, social, or institutional” concerns and that some 
substantive claims will “vindicate vitally important personal or public 
values.”149 But there is a caveat. It would require judges to promote 
the existing protections for substantive claims,150 rather than to 
substitute their own normative choices. It would also require judges to 
determine, to the extent possible, how those substantive preferences 
play into the necessary cost–benefit analysis of the proportionality 
standard and, further, how those preferences may guide on-the-ground 
discovery disputes such as the number of permissible depositions, 
scope of permissible document requests, and sequence of discovery.  
District courts should also consider any guidance provided in 
the text of the Rule or Advisory Committee Notes.151  The text of Rule 
26(b)(1), as discussed above, provides little direct guidance. The 
rulemakers did, however, place the “importance of the issues” factor 
first, to underscore the importance of that factor and to prevent any 
conclusion that the amount in controversy was the most important 
factor.152  The Committee Note similarly emphasizes the “significance 
																																								 																				
protection for substantive values, and concluding that court–based, committee–
centered rulemakers would fare better at the exercise than judges exercising 
discretion in the context of particular cases); Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. 
Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 735 (1975); 
Marcus, supra note 21, at 1238–39 (positing that courts might vary from a trans–
substantive standard to create substance–specific procedure if the more specific rule 
would support “the policy objectives . . . of an antecedent regime”).  
149. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-8, B-41 to B-42; see 
also supra notes 94–99, and accompanying text. 
150. Bone, supra note 142, at 1162. See also Bone, supra note 26, at 935–37, 
951–52 (concluding that in measuring outcome, in a rights-based court-rulemaking 
model, the procedural rulemakers should “construct from existing practice a 
coherent general theory of value that fits and justifies the pattern of protection given 
to interests by the legal system as a whole”); Marcus, supra note 21, at 1228–30 
(indicating that when judges make substance-specific procedure, they should do so 
to support policies in existing law, i.e., to support “an antecedent regime’s policy 
objectives,” in order to avoid establishing their own policy preferences and 
exceeding their lawmaking authority). 
151. Struve, supra note 130, at 1141–42, 1152–69. 
152. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, 
at B-8, B-41 to B-42 (internal quotations omitted). 
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of the substantive issues.”153  Here, the Advisory Committee 
recognized that “many cases in public policy spheres, such as 
employment practices, free speech, and other matters may have 
importance far beyond the monetary amount involved” and that a 
number of other substantive areas may present cases seeking little or 
nothing of monetary value.154  The Committee Note, thus, may be read 
to imply that the courts are not to make their own value choices, but 
are to promote the value choices in existing law. 
Additionally, the Committee Note reveals little purpose to 
reduce discovery costs through proportionality, but instead proposes 
to seek greater coincidence between claims and discovery.155  
Likewise, consistent empirical evidence reveals that discovery costs 
are not excessive except in a small set of complex cases.156  The lack 
of purpose to address radical imbalances in discovery costs also 
supports the notion that district courts should seek to further 
substantive policy choices of superior normative decision makers. 
Acting at the boundaries of their lawmaking authority and without 
evidence of excessive discovery costs in the majority of cases, district 
courts should exercise restraint in limiting discovery in areas where 
Congress or other policymakers have created favored claims. 
The text of Rule 26(b)(1) and the Committee Note also 
provides some guidance regarding cases involving “information 
asymmetry.”157  Rule 26(b)(1) includes a new factor—“the parties’ 
relative access to relevant information.”158  This factor was included 
to highlight the issue where “[o]ne party—often an individual 
plaintiff—may have very little discoverable information,” while the 
opposing party may have a substantial amount of information.159  In 
these circumstances, the Committee Note advises courts that, “the 
																																								 																				
153. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-8, B-41 to B-42 
(internal quotations omitted). 
154. Id. at B-41 to B-42. 
155. Id.  
156. Id. at B-6 to B-7. 
157. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, 
at B-40. 
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, 
at B-30. 
159. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-40 to B-46. 
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burden of responding to discovery [will] lie[] heavier” on the party 
with more information in most cases.160 District courts should follow 
this guidance. 
In addition to deferring to existing substantive policy choices 
and to guidance in the Rule and Committee Note, courts should 
provide rulings that make clear the rationale of their proportionality 
decisions.  Articulating the reasons underlying proportionality 
decisions will serve several purposes.  First, since lawmaking is 
commonly incremental, clarity regarding the basis for opinions will 
permit the development of a body of law regarding proper 
interpretation and application of the proportionality factors, which 
may be critical given the likely lack of appellate guidance.  Thus, 
district courts may, given the narrow opportunity for review of 
discovery issues, be critical actors in creating the law governing 
proportionality in discovery and in developing principles from which 
the Advisory Committee may be able to craft more helpful normative 
guidelines, create more helpful balancing factors, and provide clarity 
regarding priority of balancing factors.  Second, decisions that clearly 
indicate the bases for proportionality rulings would also provide a 
body of law for appellate courts to consider in the limited 
circumstances in which proportionality issues reach appellate review.  
Third, transparency of the rationale for proportionality decisions 
would help ensure that the district judges obtain the best information 
possible and rely on that information, rather than resorting to judicial 
intuition, heuristics, and schemas.161  Fourth, providing the reasoning 
underlying decisions would also help ensure that district courts adhere 
to the existing policy choices of superior policymakers, rather than 
substituting their own choices.  Explicit rationale for proportionality 
decisions would, thus, enhance the legitimacy of courts’ 
proportionality decisions. Indeed, in other instances in which district 
courts act at the boundaries of their authority—such as Rule 56, 
regarding summary judgment; Rule 65, regarding injunctions; and 
Rule 23, regarding class action certification—procedural rules have 
																																								 																				
160. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-41. 
161. See Bone, supra note 21, at 1986–90 (explaining obstacles to effective 
exercise of procedural discretion). 
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required or practice has provided more transparent decision 
making.162 
Fifth, a primary justification for court-made procedural 
rulemaking under the Rules Enabling Act, despite its inevitable impact 
on substantive rights, is its foundation in reasoned deliberation.163  To 
the extent the  proportionality standard substitutes case-specific 
judicial discretion regarding proportionality for committee-based, 
predetermined discovery standards,164 court opinions, too, should 
reveal the grounds for the decisions.  Indeed, commentators have 
suggested that even the Supreme Court, as Congress’s expressly 
delegated rule maker, should pay close attention to existing law when 
promulgating rules and should provide a clear statement of the 
																																								 																				
162. See Marcus, supra note 21, at 1241 (suggesting that rules promote 
reasoned deliberation); accord Sarah M. R. Cravens, Judging Discretion: Contexts 
for Understanding the Role of Judgment, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 981–82 (2010) 
(indicating that the judge’s explicit reasoning regarding the “process, the inputs, and 
the challenges” in ruling on a motion for an injunction as well as on each required 
factor for the injunction permits judicial flexibility, but also provides an “effective 
constraint on individual judgment in decisionmaking”); Frederick Schauer, Giving 
Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 651–56 (1995).  See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1).  
Accord Adamson, supra note 26, at 1045 (noting that FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1), which 
requires district courts to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in actions 
tried without a jury or with an advisory jury and for interlocutory injunctions, 
reinforces the trial court’s superiority in finding facts and the appellate court’s 
superiority in norm declaration and norm elaboration).  See also FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(c)(1) (requiring that a court must “determine by order whether to certify the 
action as a class action” and specifying that the order must “define the class, the 
class claims, issues, or defenses, and appoint class counsel”); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) 
(amended in 2010 to include a new directive that the court “should state on the 
record the reasons for granting or denying” a motion for summary judgment, which 
the accompanying Committee Note indicated accorded with practice already 
implemented by most courts). 
163. See Bone, supra note 26, at 940–41, 951–52 (suggesting that rulemakers 
creating rules through the rulemaking process should use reasoned deliberation to 
create Rules that promote a set of legal principles that do not “deviate too much from 
existing practice”); Bone, supra note 142, at 1160–63; Cover, supra note 151, at 
734–36; Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 134, at 1246–51; Struve, supra note 
130, at 1110–14. 
164. Bone, supra note 26, at 917–18, 926–29, 951–52; see also Struve, supra 
note 130, at 1119–20, 1120 n.72 (suggesting that district courts should have less 
discretion to interpret rules).  
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grounds for its procedural rulemaking choices.165  The rule makers’ 
articulation of reasoning is critical to compliance with the Rules 
Enabling Act, which provides that rules enacted pursuant to the Act 
“shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”166 
Reasoned decision making assists in legitimizing the federal rule 
makers’ procedural choices and rule makers’ discretion because it 
reveals their substantive choices, reveals the extent to which 
rulemakers adhered to existing normative decisions of Congress, and 
permits Congress to change the procedural choices in particular cases 
if it deems change necessary.167  Because the Advisory Committee has 
declined, in  Rule 26(b)(1), to make normative choices and has instead 
delegated those choices to district courts, the district courts should 
justify their case-specific choices under the proportionality standard 
by articulating the reasons for their proportionality decisions. 
Further, because appellate review will be relatively rare, it 
might also be beneficial for district courts to flag their proportionality 
decisions for study by the Federal Judicial Center and other 
commentators.  Such a study could provide the legitimacy-enhancing 
benefits discussed above while also helping to provide a measure of 
uniformity and systemic coherence—two procedural values that are 
sacrificed when rule makers authorize case-specific discretion. 
In the long term, however, the Advisory Committee should 
return to the issue of proportional discovery and should provide 
additional guidance regarding application of the proportionality 
factors or should create (1) uniform general discovery standards for 
most cases and (2) substance-specific discovery protocols for 
recurring substantive claims that often present difficult discovery 
issues.168  Indeed, the Federal Judicial Center’s October 2015 report 
																																								 																				
165. Bone, supra note 26, at 950–52; Bone, supra note 142, at 1159; Cover, 
supra note 151, at 734–40; Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 134, at 1247–51. 
166. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). 
167. Bone, supra note 26, at 950–51; Bone, supra note 142, at 1157–59; 
Cover, supra note 151, at 734–36. 
168. See, e.g., Burbank & Subrin, supra note 10, at 409–12 (suggesting a 
“simple case” track with limited discovery for cases under a certain dollar amount, 
with little opportunity for litigants to alter the limits by agreement or court order, 
which would be supplemented by substance-specific protocols for case types that 
engender burdensome discovery); Subrin, supra note 1, at 28–29, 45–56; Subrin, 
supra note 12, at 399–405; see also Bone, supra note 21, at 1994–96 (contending 
that general discovery rules and substance–specific discovery protocols, which 
provide discretion for trial courts to vary from the established norms in special cases, 
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on the Pilot Project Regarding Initial Discovery Protocols for 
Employment Cases Alleging Adverse Action provides support for 
further exploration of pattern discovery protocols.169  The Advisory 
Committee, acting in concert with plaintiffs’ attorneys, defendants’ 
attorneys, and other relevant stakeholders, would enjoy institutional 
advantages unavailable to district court judges acting in the context of 
particular cases.  Through the rulemaking process of the Rules 
Enabling Act,170 the Advisory Committee, which is composed of a 
range of lawyers and judges,171 can and does invite broad participation 
in rulemaking activities.  It gives notice of proposed rules, provides 
opportunity for comment on rule proposals, and holds public 
hearings.172  The Advisory Committee may also obtain empirical 
assessments in support of proposed rules, and its proposed rules are 
subject to multiple layers of review.173  
																																								 																				
would be superior to delegating case–specific discretion to judges); Gensler & 
Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 650–51, 654–57 (supporting proportionality balancing 
but suggesting supplementation by use of “scheme–based” protocols). 
169. Emery G. Lee III and Jason A. Cantone, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 
REPORT ON PILOT PROJECT REGARDING INITIAL DISCOVERY PROTOCOLS FOR 
EMPLOYMENT CASES ALLEGING ADVERSE ACTION 1 (2015) (comparing cases by 
federal judges who voluntarily adopted the discovery protocols and those who did 
not and concluding, inter alia, (1) motions to dismiss and for summary judgment 
were “less likely to be filed” in cases under the protocols; (2) the average number of 
discovery motions filed in cases under the protocols was about half that of the 
comparison cases; (3) it appeared that cases under the protocols were more likely to 
settle but the time to settlement was not faster; and (4) there was “no statistically 
significant difference in case processing times” between the two sets of cases). 
170. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074 (2012). 
171. 28 U.S.C. §2073(a)(2) (2012). 
172. Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1655, 1672 (1995). 
173. The Judicial Conference, which is assisted by a Standing Committee and 
five advisory committees, including the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, takes the lead in the Rule amendment process. Proposed rules 
are considered first by the appropriate advisory committee and are, thereafter, sent 
to the Standing Committee. If approved by the Standing Committee, the proposed 
Rule is sent to the Judicial Conference for approval. The Judicial Conference 
transmits approved rules to the Supreme Court, which has seven months to review 
and transmit the Rule to Congress. Congress then has seven months in which to 
delay, amend, or veto the proposals.  Absent such action by Congress, a proposed 
Rule takes effect. See Struve, supra note 130, at 1103–19, 1140 (suggesting that 
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The rulemaking process, therefore, provides better access to 
information, greater resources to aid in empirical assessment of 
information obtained, broader participation by relevant members of 
the legal community and public, and multiple tiers of review.  General 
discovery limits and substance-specific discovery protocols created 
through this rulemaking process would provide ample room for 
judicial discretion but would also provide for better, more-informed 
rules, sharpened guidance to district court judges, and heightened 
uniformity across the federal system.  Such rulemaking, though 
creating some substance-specific procedural rules, is likely within the 
Court’s rulemaking authority under the Rules Enabling Act.174  If it is 
not within the Court’s authority, however, commentators have 
pragmatically suggested that Congress could either amend the Rules 
Enabling Act to confer such authority, or it could directly enact the 
proposed rules.175 
V. CONCLUSION 
The 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) install largely 
unguided proportionality balancing as the primary determinant of 
discoverable information in the federal courts and also eliminate 
textual provisions that favored broader discovery.  The text of the 
2015 amendment to Rule 26(b)(1) and the text of the Committee Note 
provide some minimal guidance regarding the importance of the 
proportionality factors, their weight, and their application, but the 
Rule, in the main, remits these decisions to the parties and the district 
																																								 																				
rulemaking provides for greater deliberation than adjudication); see also Genetin, 
supra note 35, at 689–90 (providing background of Rules Enabling Act). 
174. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 142, at 1159–60 (emphasizing that Professor 
Cover’s “deeper point” was that sometimes the justification for a procedural choice 
“necessarily ha[s] to take account of substantive policies, and in such cases, judges 
should explain their choices publicly and make the connection to substantive policy 
explicit”); Bone, supra note 26, at 950–53 (discussing limits of court rulemaking); 
Burbank, supra note 35, at 1124–25, 1193 (proposing that, ironically, changes to 
rulemaking advanced under the Rules Enabling Act should come through 
administrative law); Cover, supra note 151, at 734–36.  But see, Joshua M. Koppel, 
Comment, Tailoring Discovery: Using Non Trans-substantive Rules to Reduce 
Waste and Abuse, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 285–87 (2012) (questioning the Supreme 
Court’s authority to promulgate substance-specific discovery rules and also 
concluding that Congress is, as an institutional matter, better-suited to the task). 
175. Burbank & Subrin, supra note 10, at 412. 
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court judge or magistrate judge in the context of particular (perhaps 
idiosyncratic) litigation. Although the proportionality standard 
permits district courts to establish discovery that meets the needs of 
each case, district courts face institutional challenges in creating case-
specific procedure that trump the supposed benefits of determining 
proportionality through case-specific balancing of listed factors. 
Aiming for the outside corner of federal court authority, the 
amendments came in wide of the mark.  District court decision makers 
are at a comparative disadvantage vis-à-vis the political branches and 
the Advisory Committee in such endeavors because they have a 
narrower range of lawmaking authority, have little ability to obtain 
broad-based information or broad participation of relevant 
stakeholders, and have limited resources to devote to evaluating 
information, making normative predictions about future events, and 
creating policy.  Further, appellate courts will rarely review discovery 
decisions.  When they do, they too will be hindered by initial failures 
of access to information by the district court and by lack of 
policymaking authority.  
I, thus, recommend that district courts promote, to the extent 
possible, the normative preferences of Congress and other 
policymakers, and defer to the admittedly limited guidance available 
in the text of Rule 26(b)(1) and the Committee Note.  I recommend as 
well that district court decision makers articulate the reasons 
underlying their proportionality decisions.  I also join the chorus of 
those suggesting that application of proportionality in discovery 
would be better achieved by the Advisory Committee’s promulgating 
discovery principles applicable to most cases and substance-specific 
protocols uniformly applicable to particular substantive claims.  If the 
discovery zone is to be narrowed for some players in the litigation 
game, rulemakers who can invite broad participation, access 
comprehensive information, and obtain sophisticated assessment of 
the information, should make those decisions on a system-wide basis. 
